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ABSTRACT
Theoretical models predict asymmetric information in health insurance markets may generate
inefficient outcomes due to adverse selection and moral hazard. However, previous empirical
research has found it difficult to disentangle adverse selection from moral hazard in health care. We
empirically study this question by using data from the Health and Retirement Study to estimate a
structural  model  of  the  demand  for  health  insurance  and  medical  care.  Using  a  two-step





















ahmed.khwaja@duke.eduI. Introduction  
There is a large theoretical literature that predicts that asymmetric information in 
insurance markets may generate inefficient outcomes due to adverse selection and moral 
hazard (see e.g., Arrow 1963, Pauly 1968, Akerlof 1970, Zeckhauser 1970, Spence and 
Zeckhauser 1971, Spence 1973, Pauly 1974, Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976, Wilson 1977, 
1980).  Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) develop a model in which adverse selection is 
present because individuals have private information about their health status.  They 
demonstrate that insurers may inefficiently ration health care by capping benefits for the 
healthiest consumers.  Similarly Pauly (1968) shows that moral hazard may be present in 
health insurance markets because consumers do not bear the full cost of health care 
expenditures.
1 
The predictions of theoretical models of insurance markets can depend quite 
delicately on whether adverse selection or moral hazard is more important.  Because of 
the complexity of insurance markets, theoretical models frequently emphasize one of 
these distortions at the expense of the other. Furthermore, optimal policy depends 
crucially on which of these distortions is most important. Thus, empirically assessing 
whether moral hazard or adverse selection is important is useful for guiding both theory 
and public policy. 
It is well recognized that it is empirically difficult to distinguish between moral 
hazard and adverse selection and consequently there is little consensus on which of these 
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1 The empirical evidence on the existence of asymmetric information in insurance markets is mixed. For 
example, recent work by Cawley and Philipson (1999) for life insurance markets; Cardon and Hendel 
(2001) for health insurance markets; and Chiappori and Salanie (2000) for automobile insurance markets, 
finds no evidence of asymmetric information. On the other hand, Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) find such 
evidence in annuity markets. In the context of health insurance, Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) review an 
extensive literature that finds evidence of adverse selection based on the positive correlation between 
generosity of the insurance contract and adverse outcomes, and moral hazard based on the coinsurance 
elasticity of the demand for medical care. two sources of inefficiency is more important.  A common method to detect asymmetric 
information is to examine the correlation between risk outcomes and a measure of the 
generosity of a contract. However, as pointed out by Chiappori and Salanié (2003), 
among others, under moral hazard the generosity of the contract will lead to adverse risk 
outcomes while under adverse selection the causality is reversed, leading to observational 
equivalence between the two hypotheses.
2  Abbring, Chiappori, Heckman and Pinquet 
(2003) have suggested that one could exploit the dynamic consequences of experience 
rating in insurance markets to distinguish between adverse selection and moral hazard. 
However, U.S. health insurance markets are regulated to restrict experience rating, which 
precludes this proposed empirical strategy.
3  
In this paper, we propose an alternative approach to the assessing the importance 
of moral hazard and adverse selection in health insurance markets.  Our approach is 
based on estimating a structural model of consumer demand for health insurance and 
medical utilization. The structural model is consistent with the theoretical models 
proposed by Spence and Zeckhauser (1971) and Blomqvist (1997) and allows for both 
adverse selection and moral hazard.  In the model, risk averse agents have preferences 
over a composite commodity and health status, and maximize utility subject to a budget 
                                                 
2 A test of asymmetric information based on the positive correlation between the generosity of the contract 
and adverse risk outcomes may also breakdown if there is heterogeneity in risk preferences (De Meza and 
Webb 2001). For example, if individuals who are highly risk averse also put more effort in to lowering 
their risk, and vice versa those who are less risk averse take fewer precautions, then there could be a 
negative correlation between the generosity of the contract and risk outcomes. Evidence of heterogeneity in 
risk preferences has been found by Finkelstein and McGarry (forthcoming) in the long term care insurance 
market and Cohen and Einav (2005) in the automobile insurance market. Chiappori, Jullien, Salanié and 
Salanié (forthcoming) develop a non parametric test to detect the presence of asymmetric information 
based on the correlation between the generosity of the contract and risk outcomes that addresses this 
limitation. However their test does not distinguish between adverse selection and moral hazard. Finkelstein 
and Poterba (2006) develop a test for adverse selection that avoids the limitation of heterogeneity in risk 
preferences. Their test is based on using data on observable characteristics of individuals that are correlated 
with the outcomes but are not used by insurers in pricing contracts.  
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3Another alternative would be to use field experiments to investigate the presence of asymmetric 
information. Karlan and Zinman (2005) provide an example of such an experiment in credit markets in 
South Africa. However the feasibility of implementing such experiments in the context of health insurance, 
especially in the U.S., is questionable. constraint. Agents have private information about their (latent) health status which is 
unobserved to the insurer leading to adverse selection. The agents do not pay the full 
costs of their health care coverage and therefore face a moral hazard problem. We 
estimate our model using a combination of publicly available and confidential data from 
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), which is a nationwide sample that contains 
information on health insurance plans, respondent location, medical expenditures and 
reimbursements from insurance plans.    
The model is estimated semiparametrically. Our econometric strategy imports 
techniques from the empirical auctions literature to the study of insurance markets.   
Following Campo, Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2003), utility is specified using a 
standard functional form.  This is convenient for comparing our estimates of risk aversion 
to existing estimates in the literature.  However, we estimate the distribution of private 
information nonparametrically. Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) argue that this is 
important because theory provides little guidance about which parametric distributions 
for latent health shocks are a priori most plausible.   
To foreshadow our results, first, we find that our model generates many results 
that are consistent with the existing empirical literature. Our estimates of risk aversion are 
consistent with much of the previous literature.  Also, we find that the median elasticity 
of the consumption of health with respect to the co-payment rate is consistent with the 
well known RAND Health Insurance study (Manning et al 1987, Newhouse 1993) of the 
late 1970’s.  
Second, we find that the elasticity of health care usage with respect to the co-
payment rates is highly nonlinear. This usage elasticity is several times higher for low 
levels of health consumption than for high levels of health consumption. We find that the 
- 4 - “sickest” consumers respond very inelastically to changes in co-payment rates compared 
to “healthy” consumers.  
Third, we propose a nonparametric test for adverse selection.  Theoretical models 
predicting separating equilibrium suggest that consumers should sort across different 
insurance categories based on their health status, which is private information to the 
consumer.  Thus, we test whether our nonparametrically estimated distributions of health 
shocks differ across insurance categories that vary in their premium and coinsurance rate.  
With the exception of consumers who self insure, we find no statistically significant 
difference in health status across major insurance categories.  This indicates a lack of 
evidence supporting models of the insurance market that predict a separating equilibrium, 
and which are commonly used in the theoretical literature. 
There has been a large empirical literature on the effects of health insurance on 
medical utilization (see Zweifel and Manning 2000 for an excellent review). The gold 
standard of this work is considered to be the RAND HIE of the late 1970’s (Manning et 
al 1987, Newhouse 1993). We note that our results agree with this earlier work for the 
median consumer.  However, there is considerable variation in these elasticities between 
the most and least healthy consumers.  We argue that a nonparametric perspective is 
important because a linear econometric model masks substantial variation in the 
distribution of elasticities. 
There is a growing body of empirical work on the structural estimation of models 
of medical utilization and health insurance choice (e.g., see the important work of 
Cameron et al. 1988, Gilleskie 1998, Harris and Keane 1999, Cardon and Hendel 2001, 
Vera-Hernandez 2003, Blau and Gilleskie 2003, Khwaja 2001, 2005). However, we 
differ from this earlier literature in three ways.  First, this earlier work uses methods from 
- 5 - discrete choice estimation and relies on parsimoniously specified parametric models.   
However, akin to the empirical literature on auctions, our estimation strategy is 
semiparametric.  Second, we allow for both adverse selection and moral hazard due to 
asymmetric information in the estimation procedure. Third, the earlier literature, though it 
controls for the endogeneity of selection in to insurance plans, assumes that prices are 
exogenous. This contradicts the theoretical literature which predicts consumers sort 
between plans based on their private information about health status.  We propose an 
instrumental variables strategy that accommodates not only selection in to insurance 
plans but also the price endogeneity of these contracts.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in section II. 
Section III discusses the data, with the estimation and identification strategy discussed in 
section IV. Results follow in section V, with examination of adverse selection and moral 
hazard in section VI. Section VII concludes. 
II. Model  
II.A. Overview  
We specify a model of endogenous consumer demand for health insurance and 
medical utilization that allows for heterogeneity in the distribution of latent health status. 
Individuals have private information about their latent health status at the time of making 
choices about health insurance and consumption of medical care. There is asymmetric 
information in that insurers know the distribution of the latent health status but do not 
have the same information that the individuals have. Insurers however recognize the 
existence of this asymmetric information and formulate their contracts appropriately.  In 
our empirical analysis we allow for the endogoeneity of the insurance contract with 
regard to the distribution of latent health status. We focus on estimating the demand side 
- 6 - parameters while flexibly accommodating the endogeneity of the supply of health 
contracts. Given the complex nature of the health insurance market, it is not often clear 
what the economic objective of insurers is, i.e., whether insurers maximize profits (e.g., 
for-profit insurance plans) or pool social risk at the expense of profits (e.g., Medicare) or 
provide fringe benefits in kind (e.g., employer provided insurance). Hence we do not 
explicitly model the insurer’s problem. However, our model is robust to adverse selection 
and moral hazard that may be generated due to asymmetric information that individuals 
have about their latent health status relative to insurers.  
II.B. Model Structure 
II.B.1. The Timing Convention 
Individuals in the model are assumed to make decisions about the purchase of 
health insurance and medical care in a staggered fashion. Following Cardon and Hendel 
(2001), and Khwaja (2001, 2005) there are two time periods in the model. Given a menu 
of insurance options, individuals in the first time period make a choice about an insurance 
plan. In the second time period, conditional on the first period insurance choice and a 
realization from the distribution of latent health status, the individuals make a choice 
about medical utilization.  
II.B.2. The First Time Period: Insurance Choice  
The individuals face a menu of choices from a set of available insurance plans 
(D). Each individual has private information about their latent health status. Given their 
age, each individual self selects in to one of the insurance plans  D d ∈  based on his or 
her private information about latent health status. Our estimation strategy (described 
below) allows for adverse selection based on the distribution of latent health status even 
- 7 - though we do not explicitly model the process through which individuals self-select in to 
insurance plans. 
II.B.3. The Second Time Period: Medical Utilization Choice  
Conditional on the insurance choice in the first time period and a realization from 
the distribution of latent health status, each individual makes a decision about medical 
utilization in the second period. The individuals choose the level of medical utilization 
that maximizes their utility from health status and the consumption of a composite good. 
The utility function and the budget constraint are described below. 
II.B.4. The Utility Function  
Following Spence and Zeckhauser (1971) and Bloomqvist (1997) we specify the 
consumer’s utility function, U(c, m-θ;  γ), to depend on the level of composite good 
consumption c, the amount of medical utilization m, the consumer’s latent health status θ, 
and the parameters γ that characterize the utility function of the consumer. As in Cardon 
and Hendel (2001), medical utilization is assumed to be a perfect substitute for health 
shocks in the individual’s utility function. This is a restrictive assumption but as found 
previously by Cardon and Hendel it captures the essential features of the data well. Also 
this allows for the preventive aspects of medical care, i.e., people incur medical 
expenditures even in good health for preventive purposes. Both m and θ are assumed to 
be expressed in terms of monetary units. Therefore only the difference between m and θ 
directly enters the utility function. In particular we specify the utility function to be 
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The utility function allows for risk aversion in wealth (see e.g. Hubbard, Skinner and 
Zeldes 1995, Gertler and Gruber 2002) through the parameters on the composite consumption good as well as in health status (see e.g., Khwaja 2001, 2005) through the 
parameters on the difference between medical utilization and latent health status.
4 The 
budget constraint faced by the consumer is 
) (m z p y c − − = , 
where y is an exogenously given level of income, p denotes the  premium or the fixed 
cost of participating in the health insurance policy, and z(m) denotes the out of pocket 
expenditure or the co-payment of the individual. Alternatively, the reimbursement 
scheme used by the insurance plan is that $(m – z) will be reimbursed to the consumer if 
the consumer incurs $m in medical expenses. We assume that the insurer specifies the 
reimbursement schedule (m - z(m)) prior to the realization of an individual’s health shock 
θ. The fact that the reimbursement schedule is only a function of the medical utilization m 
and does not directly depend on the health status realization θ creates a moral hazard 
problem. After the realization of the health status θ, the consumer chooses the level of 
health services m as a function of θ, m(θ), to maximize his or her utility. We further 
assume that m is a non-decreasing function of θ. Whenever m(θ) is strictly positive the 
following first order condition holds, 
[ ] 0 ) ( ' ) ; , ( ) ; , ( = − − − m z m c U m c U c m γ θ γ θ .   (2) 
Equation (1) provides the condition for the optimal choice of medical utilization that 
maximizes an individual’s utility conditional on the insurance status and the health shock 
realization. This is the standard marginal rate of substitution (MRS) rule for allocating 
income between the composite commodity and medical care. It states that the ratio of 
marginal utilities from medical care and the composite commodity should be equated to 
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4 We abstract away from heterogeneity in risk preferences and focus on testing for asymmetric information 
through direct measures of adverse selection and moral hazard elicited by our structural model. In principle 
our method can be extended to include preference heterogeneity. A reason we did not implement this was 
because of the nature of our data, which in particular limited the number of instruments and hence the 
number of endogenous parameters we could estimate. their respective prices.  Intuitively, conditional on the insurance contract an individual 
equates the marginal benefit of medical care measured in terms of improvement in utility 
to the marginal cost of medical utilization in terms of out of pocket expenditures using 
the composite commodity as the numeraire good. This optimality condition relates the 
unobserved health status θ to the observable medical utilization of the consumer m. 
Under the previous specification, this optimality condition becomes 
     ( ) ) ( ' ) (
1 3
2 m z c m
γ γ θ γ
− − = − .    (3) 
We use this condition as a basis for developing our identification and estimation strategy 
which we describe in greater detail in section IV.
5  
III. Data 
We estimate our model using data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). 
The HRS is a nationally representative sample of men and women born between 1931 
and 1941 and their spouses or partners, who could be of any age (see Juster and Suzman 
1995 for an excellent and detailed review of the data, and also 
http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu). At the initiation of the survey, in 1992 (wave 1), 12,652 
people from 7,607 households were asked questions about economic and demographic 
characteristics and various life cycle choices. The study also included questions about 
respondents’ health insurance choices and their medical expenditures. The HRS 
oversampled blacks, Hispanics, and residents of Florida. We use data on individuals from 
wave 3 (1996) of the HRS because this is the most recent wave for which we have data 
on out of pocket and total medical expenditures.
6   The publicly available data is 
supplemented by confidential data on location of residence to help create instrumental 
                                                 
5 Such an approach to estimating structural parameters using first order conditions also has a long tradition 
in labor economics, e.g., Heckman and MaCurdy (1980). Recent work by Sieg (2000) also uses an 
approach based on first order conditions that involve derivatives of unknown functions.   
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6 We are grateful to Dan Hill at HRS for providing us with this data. variables used in our analysis. The variables used in our analysis are described in detail in 
appendix I and summary statistics are in table 1.  
In the empirical analysis we specify the set of insurance choices in the following 
way. Given the nature of our data, and the institutional features of the U.S. health 
insurance market (primarily that almost all individuals 65 or older have access to 
Medicare insurance) the insurance choice set (D) depends on whether individuals are 
younger than 65, or 65 or older. For individuals younger than 65 D consists of the 
following choices: employer provided health insurance, Veterans 
Administration/Champus insurance, insurance through own business for self-employed, 
privately purchased insurance, and no insurance (uninsured).
7 For individuals 65 or older 
D consists of: employer provided health insurance, Veterans Administration/Champus 
insurance, insurance through own business for self-employed, Medicare insurance with or 
without private Medigap insurance.
8 In the rest of the paper we use the term insurance 
plan and insurance category interchangeably. It is well known that different kinds of 
insurance plans may exist within each of the insurance categories included in the choice 
set but our data does not permit a more disaggregated analysis. 
In wave 3 (1996) of the HRS we have data on 10,030 individuals in 6,351 
households. Since the measure of income (in particular non wage income) is only 
available at the household level we compute the other variables in the budget constraint at 
the household level as well. We create household level variables by combining 
                                                 
7 It should be noted that the choice of health insurance is closely related to the employment decision of the 
individual. Our model does not include an employment decision in the interest of simplicity and due to the 
computational burden this would place on the estimator that we develop. An extensive review of the 
relationship between availability of health insurance coverage and the labor market decisions of individuals 
is provided by Currie and Madrian (1999) and Gruber (2000).   
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8In our sample 316 or 8.66% of the individuals are uninsured, 2644 or 72.48% have employer provided 
insurance, 81 or 2.22% are self-employed with insurance through their own business, 123 or 3.37% are on 
VA/Champus,  255 or 6.99% have privately purchased insurance, and 229 or 6.28% are on Medicare.  information on adults in the same household. Since the budget constraint is calculated for 
households, the model is estimated at the household level. Therefore in the rest of the 
paper, by individuals we mean individual households.  
The data are trimmed for our analysis in the following way: (1) Observations 
where household income, household insurance premium, or household out of pocket 
medical expenditure was missing were dropped. This left a sample 4645 observations. (2) 
Observations where household out of pocket medical expenditure exceeded household 
total medical expenditure were dropped.  This reduced sample size to 4540, a drop of 
approximately 2%. (3) Observations where household income was less than the sum of 
household insurance premium, and household out of pocket medical expenditure were 
dropped.  This reduced sample size to 4412, a drop of approximately 3% of remaining 
observations. (4) Observations where the insurance category was Medicaid were dropped.  
This reduced the sample size to 4155, a drop of approximately 6% of remaining 
observations. (5) Outliers for household total medical expenditure were dropped.   
Outliers were observations with values of household total medical expenditure below the 
second percentile or above the ninety seventh percentile.  This reduced the sample size to 
3935, a drop of approximately 5% of remaining observations. (6) Observations where an 
individual was both on Medicare and younger than 65 were dropped.  This reduced the 
sample size to 3724, a drop of approximately 5% of remaining observations. (7) 
Observations where the estimated derivative of out of pocket medical expenditure with 
respect to household total medical expenditure, was negative were dropped (for reasons 
that are further explained when describing the estimation strategy in section IV).  This 
reduced the sample size to 3648, a drop of approximately 2% of remaining observations.  
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IV.A. Two Step Estimation Strategy and Identification  
We propose a semiparametric estimator to recover the parameters of the utility 
function,  γ. The major advantage of this strategy is that we do not have to rely on 
parametric assumptions about the latent health distribution in estimating the parameters 
of the model. The key insight of our identification strategy, is that both the co-payment 
rate z’(m) (and in turn the reimbursement schedule (m - z(m)), and the distribution of the 
health status θ can be non-parametrically identified using the optimality condition 
(equation 3) about the level of medical utilization. These non-parametric estimates can in 
turn be used to estimate the risk aversion parameters, γ1 and γ3. Therefore, our 
identification strategy depends only on the specification of the utility function and on the 
validity of the economic hypothesis of utility maximization but not on the statistical 
hypotheses regarding the reimbursement schedule and the distribution of latent health 
status.  
The estimation method proceeds in two steps. In the first step, we 
nonparametrically estimate the health insurance co-payment schedules using data on out 
of pocket medical expenditures and insurance choices. The identification assumption is 
that insurance plans may design reimbursement policies given their expectation about the 
distribution of latent health status (in anticipation of adverse selection) but once 
individuals opt for a particular plan the reimbursement schedule cannot further 
discriminate against particular individuals. In other words the reimbursement schedule 
cannot be made individual specific though it may be group specific. We use a local linear 
estimator to nonparametrically recover from the data the co-payment schedule 
conditional on insurance choice.  
- 13 - Given data on i  individuals about their choice of insurance plans di 
(specified here as a 5 by 1 vector of dummies for 5 of the six insurance categories with 
privately purchased insurance as the omitted category), whether they live in an urban area 
wi, their level of out of pocket medical expenditures zi and the level of total medical 
expenditures mi, we estimate the mean regression equation for z(q), where q =  [m d w], 
using a local linear estimator. We use the specification,  .
n , , 1K =
) ( ] | [ ε ε + = + = = q z q Q z E z  
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In particular, h is a sequence of bandwidth parameters, α is the conditional expectation, 
and β is a vector of derivatives in the local linear estimator (see e.g., Fan and Gijbels 
1996, pp. 298-299 for details). In the local linear regression we smooth over observations 
using Gaussian kernel weights (K) for insurance plan dummies and the urban/rural 
dummy. This is done to utilize information from other plans in estimating the contract as 
the number of observations is small for some of the plans (e.g., self-employed insurance 
category). Letting σj be the standard deviation of the j
th variable in q, and N be the 
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The bandwidth is fixed to be 0.95. Following Bajari and Kahn (2005) we chose the 
bandwidth based on visual inspection of the estimates because as pointed out by them, 
the bandwidth size suggested by asymptotic theory in Fan and Gijbels (1996) is unlikely to be reliable in the presence of 7 regressors. This specification captures any non-linearity 
in the co-payment schedule e.g., deductibles, maximum annual out of pocket limit, 
maximum life-time reimbursement limit (see e.g., Keeler, Newhouse and Phelps 1977 for 
the complications that arise when such non-linearities are ignored).  
In the second step, we use the instrument variables (denoted by x) to identify and 
estimate both the utility function parameters γ and the distribution of the latent health 
status θ. The key identifying assumption is the independence between the instruments (x) 
and the health status shocks (θ) (instruments are described in greater detail below). Even 
though the health status shocks (θ) are unobservable they can be uniquely recovered from 
the observable medical utilization by inverting the optimality condition given by equation 
3.  To illustrate, given any candidate value for the utility function parameters γ, for each 
individual  , the unobservable health status θi can be recovered from the 
observed medical utilization mi using the consumer optimality condition (equation 3), 
where z(mi) is replaced by the estimated function   recovered using the local linear 
estimator.
9 Hence θi can be written as 
n i , , 1K =
) ( ˆ i m z
( γ ϕ θ ), ( ˆ , , , ˆ
i i i i i m z y p m = ) .       ( 5 )  
In particular, given our utility specification (equation 1) and under the additional 
assumption that z’(m) ≥ 0, equation 5 is uniquely defined as 
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− + − − = i i i i i i i i i i m z m m z p y m m z y p m . 
The economic intuition for the condition z’(m)  ≥ 0 is that as the medical utilization 
increases the co-payment should not decrease.    
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9 For notational convenience we suppress the dependence of    on the individual’s choice of 
insurance plan di, and whether he or she lives in an urban area wi. 
) ( ˆ i m zUsing the instrument variables xi for each individual i n , , 1K =  we formulate a 
method of moment estimator where the parameters of the utility function γ and the 
median of the unconditional distribution of health status (µθ) are jointly estimated by 
minimizing the following objective function,     
  () ( ) { }
n
− 5 . 0
n






), ( ˆ , , , 1 ) (
1
min arg ) ˆ , ˆ ( θ µ γ ϕ θ µ γ  ,    (6) 
where ||•||n is a typical quadratic norm i.e., ||x ||n = x’Wnx, for a suitably chosen weighting 
matrix W that is used in generalized method of moments estimation, and g(x) is a set of 
functions that generate different functional forms for a given vector of instrumental 
variables x. The estimation procedure iterates between using equations 5 and 6 to obtain 
consistent estimates of the utility parameters γ and the distribution of the latent health 
status θ.   
In the HRS data we observe that some individuals have zero out of pocket 
medical expenditures, e.g., because they did not consume medical care.
10 Hence we use a 
median based moment condition instead of the conventional mean based moment 
condition because the former is more robust to censoring at the  upper and lower tails of 
the the conditional distribution of the observables (see e.g., Powell 1984, Hong and 
Tamer 2003). Our two step method of moments estimation procedure also helps us avoid 
formulating an explicit selection equation for the choice of health insurance plans, as 
would be the case if we used a likelihood based approach. 
The first stage estimates of the implicit prices will converge at a nonparametric 
rate.  However, as demonstrated below, the estimates of the structural parameters will 
converge at the standard parameter rate, i.e. n
1/2.  This semiparametric estimation strategy 
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10 In our estimation sample 3.14% or 125 observations have zero OOP medical expenditure.  The 125 
observations are broken down among insurance categories as: no insurance-24, employer provided-73, 
VA/Champus-19, privately purchased insurance-3, Medicare-6. is attractive because it imposes minimal a priori restrictions on our first stage estimates 
but still allows for a parametric convergence rate.  
Our identification strategy makes use of instruments that provide exogenous 
variation in the characteristics of the health insurance plans. The instruments we use 
come from geographic variation in (i) the state level housing price index, (ii) the county 
level malpractice insurance component of the Geographic Practice Cost Index (GPCI) 
developed by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission to reimburse medical 
practices that treat Medicare beneficiaries (see appendix for more details), and (iii) 
number of establishments in a county.
11  
We assume that these instruments reflect county level variation in the costs of 
providing insurance and are independent of the distribution of latent health status of the 
consumers. Alternatively put, the identification assumption is that our instruments 
provide variation in the price of providing medical care relative to other goods but are 
uncorrelated with the latent health distribution. More specifically, higher costs of 
malpractice liability insurance should increase expenditures of medical providers directly, 
and indirectly may also increase the costs of providing medical care if it induces the 
practice of defensive medicine. Both of these would be reflected in the price of insurance. 
A higher state level housing price index should increase the costs of providing medical 
care by affecting construction and rental costs for medical infrastructure, as well as may 
affect the compensation to physicians because of higher costs of living. This in turn 
would be reflected in the price of insurance. A larger number of establishments in a 
county could affect the price of insurance in various ways. It could increase the employee 
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11 We also tried other instruments that could potentially play the role of cost shifters in the supply of 
insurance (e.g., the number of employees in the firm that employs an individual, local unemployment rate, 
average local income, HMO penetration) but found these to have weak explanatory power. Hence these 
were not used in estimating the model. risk pool and hence the lower the costs of providing insurance. Additionally it could 
provide more bargaining power to coalitions of employers in negotiating insurance 
contracts with insurers leading to lower prices of insurance. Also in equilibrium it may 
attract more insurers to the area leading to changes in the costs and prices of contracts 
due to aggregation effects.  
In addition, a feature of the HRS data is that (almost) all individuals who are older 
than 65 are eligible for Medicare coverage. Thus Medicare eligibility provides exogenous 
variation in the set of insurance choices which potentially helps in the identification of 
the distribution of latent health status. 
IV.B. The Relationship with Linear Instrumental Variables Estimation 
Our estimation strategy is similar to the use of instrumental variables in 
conventional two stage least square estimation of demand equations. The unobserved 
health status θ is the analogue of the unobserved error term in a structural linear demand 
equation. In that case, once the parameters of the linear demand equation are estimated, 
the conditional or unconditional distributions of the error term can also be recovered non-
parametrically by inverting the linear equation. This is similar to our procedure for 
recovering the distribution of θ by inverting the implicit function defined by equation 3. 
Once we have the estimates of the co-payment schedule,  , from the first stage, we 
can rewrite equation 3 as,  
) ( ˆ m z
( ) ) ( ' ˆ ) (
1 3
2 m z c m
γ γ θ γ
− − = − .        ( 7 )  
Given that we observe data on consumption (c) and medical expenditures (m), we 
recover utility parameters γ and the distribution of the latent health status θ in the 
following way. The instruments (x) generate exogenous shifts in the relative price of 
medical care that are uncorrelated with the health shock (θ). Thus intuitively we can hold 
- 18 - θ “fixed” while the relative prices are shifted by the instruments, which leads to co-
movement in c and m. Such co-movements allow us to identify the utility parameters γ. 
Once we have estimated the utility parameters we can use equation 3 (or 7) to back out 
the distribution of health status (θ). The difference between our method and the 
conventional two stage least squares estimator, is that instead of relying on a reduced 
form specification of a linear functional form for the demand equation, we use the 
optimality condition for a risk averse consumer in equation 3 to derive the functional 
form of the demand equation.  
Previous research, such as Cardon and Hendel (2001), that uses sophisticated 
discrete choice models assumes that health shocks are uncorrelated with characteristics of 
the insurance plan, such as price or reimbursement rates.  Nonetheless, standard models 
of insurance markets would predict that unobserved health status should be correlated 
with price or other contract characteristics if there is a separating equilibrium.  There is 
no obvious solution based on an IV strategy to the problem of endogeneity in a discrete 
choice framework. An advantage of our approach is that we are able to instrument in a 
fairly straightforward manner. 
A second attractive feature of our estimator is that we are able to derive a 
nonparametric distribution of agent’s private information.  There are very few papers that 
attempt to structurally estimate empirical models of contracts, with the notable exceptions 
of Ferall and Scherer (1999), Paarsch and Scherer (2000), and Cardon and Hendel (2001).  
Because of the complexity of these models, these researchers are forced to make fairly 
strong parametric assumptions about the distribution of private information.  In the 
empirical auctions literature (e.g., Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) and Athey and 
Haile (2002)) it is commonly argued that theory provides very little guidance about the 
- 19 - appropriate parametric distribution for agent’s private information.  Furthermore, it is 
commonly argued that conclusions about distortions from informational rents and other 
distortions will be biased if ad hoc parametric assumptions about the distribution of 
private information are imposed on the model.  Therefore, the literature has emphasized 
the importance of estimating private information under the weakest possible parametric 
restrictions.  To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to semiparametrically 
estimate a structural model with adverse selection and moral hazard.  
IV.C. Computation of Standard Errors 
In this section we discuss how we compute the correct standard errors for the two 
step semiparametric estimator for the parameters γ and µ, where γ are the parameters in 
the utility function and µ are the nuisance parameters that characterize the median of the 
distribution of the health status shock θ.  
       The estimator that we use in this paper is based on moment conditions of the form 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ∑ = = ⋅ n
i i m z i m z i w i x h
n
z n m 1 ˆ , ˆ , ' ˆ ), ( ˆ , ,
1
) ( ˆ , ˆ , ˆ µ γ ϕ µ γ , 
where  xi  denote the instruments and wi denote the data   and d , for each 
individual  . For example, equation (6) gives the particular form of the moment 
condition 
i y i p i m , , i
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()
 we use in the estimation procedure. The GMM 
estimator  µ γ α ˆ , ˆ ˆ =  is calculated using the quadratic norm 
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The asymptotic distribution of α ˆ , as is usual for a two step GMM estimator, is given by 
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To derive , we use the theory developed in Newey (1994), who showed that   does 
not depend on the particular nonparametric method that is used to estimate   and 
Ω Ω
() ⋅ z () ⋅ ' z .  
     To describe the asymptotic distribution using the framework of Newey (1994), define 
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Then following Newey (1994), under suitable regularity conditions we can write, up to a 
term that converges to 0 in probability,  ( ) ) ( ˆ , , ⋅ z m n n µ γ  as 
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Given that we know the form of the limiting variance, the next and final step is to obtain 
a consistent estimate of Ω, the asymptotic variance. For this we need to obtain consistent 
- 21 - estimates of the elements of the asymptotic linear influence function. Each of these 
components is related to the conditional expectation function, 
()() () ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] i i i i i i i i i i d m m z m z w x h E d m m z m z h , | , , ' ), ( , , ; , ' , µ γ ϕ = , 
which can be estimated nonparametrically and consistently. We obtain nonparametric 
estimates of the linear influence functions and then estimate the asymptotic standard 
errors by the empirical sum of the outer product of the estimated influence function. 
V. Estimates of Model Parameters 
We next discuss the results from the two step semiparametric estimation of the 
model presented in section III. Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the first stage 
local linear regression of the co-payment schedule z(m). The omitted category is privately 
purchased insurance and for individuals in this baseline category the average out of 
pocket expenditure is $1,676 (all values are in 1996 dollars). We find that uninsured 
individuals on average incur an out of pocket expenditure of $1,333,
12 which is higher 
than for those with employer provided insurance who incur an average expenditure of 
$1,133 but lower than the average expenditure of $1,892 for self employed individuals 
with insurance through their own business. Individuals on Medicare incur an average 
expenditure of $1,096, while those on VA/Champus have an average expenditure of 
$914, which is the lowest among the insurance categories. At the mean a 1% increase in 
total medical expenditure leads to a 11% increase in out of pocket expenditures. Those 
who live in an urban area (defined as central counties of metropolitan areas of population 
of one million or more) incur an average lower expenditure of $56. The differences in out 
of pocket expenditures across plans may be explained by differences in co-payment rates 
(i.e., incentives of the insurance plan) as well as differences in medical utilization, e.g., 
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12 This is the difference between the constant and the parameter on the dummy variable for insurance 
category 1. the individuals who do not have insurance (and are not reimbursed) have lower average 
expenditures than those who are self-employed because they seek less medical care. We 
also find that the individuals in the self employed insurance category have the largest 
variation in their out of pocket expenditures, implying that they bear the greatest risk, 
whereas those in the employer provided category bear the least risk. 
Figures 1 shows that the co-payment schedule has a concave shape. Figure 2 
provides a description of the gradient of the co-payment schedule. The gradient is non-
negative almost everywhere implying that the co-payment does not decrease as total 
medical expenses (or medical utilization) increase, i.e., z’(m) ≥  0. This is important for 
the implementation of our two stage estimation procedure.
13 Figures 1 and 2 imply that 
the out of pocket expenditures are an increasing function of the total medical 
expenditures even though the co-payment rate decreases as total medical expenditures 
increase.  These figures demonstrate that the expected co-payment rate is a nonlinear 
function of expenditures and therefore it is advantageous to model an agent’s co-payment 
rates flexibly using a nonparametric framework.  Figure 2 suggests that at the highest 
levels of expenditure, the co-payment rate is significantly smaller than at lower levels of 
expenditure.  Our estimates suggest that this variation in co-payment rates occurs within a 
plan, rather than between plans as suggested by models predicting a separating 
equilibrium in insurance markets.  Such a contract would be consistent with behavior if 
the incentives for individuals to economize on discretionary health expenditures at the 
margin are the least at the lowest levels of total medical expenditures.   
                                                 
13As described in the data section, in estimating the structural parameters we dropped 76 observations or 
2% of the sample for which the derivative of the copayment schedule was negative.  
 
- 23 - Table 3 presents the second step estimates of the utility parameters. To our 
knowledge we are the first to estimate the coefficient of relative risk aversion with 
respect to health as distinct from that for aggregate consumption. Associated with this we 
also estimate the utility weight for consumption of health relative to aggregate 
consumption. The coefficient of relative risk aversion for the aggregate consumption 
commodity (γ1) is estimated to be 0.85, while that for the consumption of health care (γ3) 
is 1.52. Thus individuals are more risk averse with respect to health status than the 
aggregate consumption commodity. These numbers are broadly within the range of the 
estimates found in the literature on consumption (see e.g., Zeldes 1989, Shea 1995, 
Hansen and Singleton 1982, Gourinchas and Parker 2002). The utility weight (γ2) on the 
consumption of health status relative to the aggregate consumption commodity is 
estimated to be 1.37. The individuals value consumption of health status more than they 
do the consumption of the aggregate consumption commodity. Hence an individual 
would have to be compensated more than one dollar worth of the aggregate consumption 
commodity in order to give up one dollar worth of health status.  The monetary value of 
the median level of the latent health shocks (θ) is found to be $3,994 in 1996 dollars.  
VI. Examination of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection 
VI.A.1. Moral Hazard  
We adopt a definition of “moral hazard” similar to one conventionally used in the 
health economics literature (e.g., Pauly 1968). In contract theory, instead, this term is 
reserved for situations in which agent’s behavior cannot be directly observed by the 
agent, i.e., “hidden actions.” Our definition of moral hazard is closer to the concept of 
sequential contracting in contract theory, i.e., the agent receives private information in 
multiple stages during the contractual relationship. Hence the principal first offers a menu 
- 24 - of contracts and the agent chooses one contract. After receiving additional private 
information the agent selects his best action within the previously chosen contract (see 
e.g., Courty and Li 2000, Dai, Lewis and Lopomo forthcoming).  
We develop and compute a measure of moral hazard that is more general than the 
one traditionally found in the empirical literature, e.g., Manning et al (1987).
14 Using the 
structural estimates of the utility parameters and the distribution of latent health status, 
we compute the elasticity of total medical expenditure with respect to a local change in 










This represents a counter factual policy experiment where for each individual there is a 
marginal change in the co-payment rate with a corresponding change in the demand for 
medical care. If the co-payment rate was a constant r, then the co-payment schedule 
would be a linear function of the total expenditure, i.e.,  z(m) = r.m, and our measure of 
moral hazard would be identical to that used traditionally in the literature (e.g., Pauly 
1968). 
One advantage of this new measure of moral hazard is that it allows for 
considerable nonlinearities in the change in behaviors with respect to changes in the 
reimbursement policy. This allows us to compute a distribution of elasticities for our 
sample, rather than computing a single statistic of this measure. We compute elasticities 
for every individual i  in our data set using their observed level of total medical 
expenditures and their associated out of pocket costs, given the estimates of the model 
parameters. This elasticity is calculated by applying the implicit function theorem to the 
n , , 1K =
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14 Vera-Hernandez (2003) also computes a variant of the traditional measure of moral hazard in the medical 
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Table 4 provides the summary statistics of this elasticity conditional on the 
insurance category. We find that overall at the median, a one percent increase in the rate 
of co-payment leads to a 0.21 percent drop in total medical expenditures. This number is 
consistent with that values found in the RAND study (Manning et al. 1987, Newhouse 
1993). In particular, Manning et al (1987, pp. 267-268) find that the mean coinsurance 
elasticity calculated using episodes of treatment for all types of care lies in the range of -
0.17 and -0.22. They report that the average coinsurance elasticity calculated using an 
indirect utility function over medical expenditures (which is conceptually the closest to 
our calculation) yields an estimate of -0.18. They also report mean values in the range of 
-0.1 and -0.14 using a calculation of coinsurance elasticity based on average coinsurance 
rates.  That the median of the estimated distribution of elasticities does not differ 
substantially from that in the existing literature gives us confidence that our model does 
not suffer from severe misspecification bias.  
Our estimation strategy allows us to examine the entire distribution of elasticities 
which may exhibit a wide range due to nonlinearities in the contracts, i.e., the co-payment 
schedule. Economic theory predicts (e.g., Pauly 1968) individuals with smaller (and 
presumably more discretionary) medical expenditures would tend to be more elastic as 
opposed to those with larger (and presumably more non-discretionary) medical 
expenditures. We find evidence to substantiate this, i.e., the overall elasticity at the 25
th 
percentile of medical expenditures is -0.47, while at the 75
th percentile it is -0.010. This 
- 26 - pattern of variation in elasticities is similar across the different insurance categories. 
Table 4 also shows that at the median, individuals in the privately purchased insurance 
category are the least elastic. One potential explanation for this is that there may be self 
selection of relatively unhealthy individuals in to this insurance category. On the other 
hand, at the median, individuals in the self-employed insurance category are the most 
elastic, which may be due to these individuals being relatively healthy. We explore the 
issue of selection further in section VI.C.  
VI.A.2. A Distribution Free Test For Moral Hazard 
We propose a distribution free test for moral hazard using our estimates.  A 
prediction of many models of insurance markets is that different contracts exist in the 
market in order to give consumers choice in economizing on health expenditures.  An 
implication of such theories is that we should expect to see the co-payment elasticity vary 
across health plans. 
We test formally for the differences in the distribution of elasticities across the 
insurance categories using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistics. These are reported in 
Table 5 and show that in general there is not much statistical difference in the distribution 
of elasticities across plans. The exceptions are that the distribution of elasticities in the no 
insurance category is significantly different from those in the employer provided and 
Medicare categories, and that in employer provided category is significantly different 
from that in the privately purchased insurance category. In general, the implication is that 
all the insurance categories offer contracts that are designed to induce large elasticities at 
low expenditures and small elasticities at high expenditures. This may be the 
consequence of a common approach to dealing with moral hazard in these insurance 
plans.  An important implication for empirical research is that it is as important to look at 
- 27 - within plan variation in the elasticity of medical utilization with respect to co-payment as 
it is to look at variation across plans. 
Figure 3 plots the densities and Figure 4 the CDF of the elasticities by insurance 
category. The density plots look very similar across insurance categories, much like the 
elasticities reported in Table 4. In each of these the left tail is quite thick as expected with 
a mode close to zero. In particular Figure 4 shows that the entire distribution of 
elasticities in the self-employed insurance category is stochastically dominated by the 
CDFs of the other insurance categories. This suggests that individuals in the self-
employed insurance category are the most elastic irrespective of where they lie in the 
distribution in that category.  
VI.A.3. The Relationship Between Observables and Moral Hazard 
In order to better understand the factors affecting moral hazard, we examine the 
correlation between the estimated elasticities and various individual characteristics. The 
results are reported in Table 6. Our preferred specification is in column IV. We find that 
individuals who are older and white are more inelastic, where as individuals with higher 
income are more elastic. Individuals who are in the employer provided, self employed 
and privately purchased insurance categories are more inelastic relative to those on 
Medicare, which is the omitted insurance category. Elasticity is monotonically increasing 
in self reported health status, i.e., individuals who have a higher self reported health 
status are more elastic (the omitted category is “poor” health). We also find that 
education is not correlated with elasticity. These results suggest that individuals who are 
younger and healthier would be more elastic and more responsive to incentives of 
contracts, and hence a more appealing pool of clients for insurers.  
 
- 28 - VI.B.1. Adverse Selection.     
The results of our estimation procedure allow us to recover measures of the latent 
health shock, θ, for each individual (using equation 5). We obtain a value for θ in 1996 
dollars and a higher value signifies poorer health. To our knowledge we are the first to 
quantify the latent type of an individual in the context of a model of (health insurance) 
contracts. Table 7 reports the distribution of the overall latent health status and 
conditional on insurance category. The median level of overall health shock is about 
$4,063 (over two years). Individuals also face substantial risk, as measured by the inter-
quartile range of $10,945, which is more than twice the median value of the health shock.  
In comparing across insurance categories, we find that individuals who are not 
insured have the best latent health status at the median. Similarly, the risk faced by these 
individuals as measured by the inter-quartile range is the lowest, i.e., $8,857. This 
suggests that individuals in good health tend not to purchase insurance due to the lower 
risk that they face. On the other hand individuals on the VA/Champus plans have the 
worst latent health status at the median and also face the highest risk with an inter-
quartile range of $18,014. The 75
th percentile of the distribution of latent health shocks in 
this category is much larger than for any of the other categories suggesting that there are 
some very sick individuals on the VA/Champus plans. This is not surprising since these 
are veterans who are older than 50 years of age. In general we find that there is great 
variation in latent health status within each insurance category.  
VI.B.2. A Distribution Free Test For Adverse Selection 
We propose a distribution free test for adverse selection similar to that for moral 
hazard. An implication of adverse selection would be that the distribution of the latent 
health shock varies across health plans. We test for this formally using Kolmogorov-
- 29 - Smirnov test statistics, which are reported in Table 8. Although, Table 7 suggests that 
individuals who are not insured are healthier and face a lower risk than others, while 
those in the VA/Champus plan are unhealthier and face greater risks than others, we 
cannot reject the equality of the distributions of latent health status across insurance 
categories. Figure 5 shows the densities of the latent health shock conditional on 
insurance category. It is seen that all the distributions are skewed to the right and have a 
probability mass close to zero. Thus a large number of individuals in each insurance 
category do not suffer large health shocks, but there are some individuals with very large 
health shocks in each category. The density for VA/Champus has a particularly thick 
right tail indicating that a sizeable portion of individuals in this category suffer from poor 
health. Figure 6 shows the CDFs associated with the latent health distribution in each 
insurance category. Though the CDF of the health shocks in the VA/Champus category is 
not stochastically dominated by the other CDFs; for a non trivial portion of the support it 
lies below the other CDFs. This is again evidence that individuals in this category are in 
poorer health compared to those in other insurance categories.  
It is possible that we are unable to find evidence of adverse selection because our 
insurance categories are very broad (e.g., in our data employer provided insurance is one 
category whereas employers typically offer a choice of multiple plans to employees). 
Conceivably, evidence for adverse selection may be found if an examination was done at 
a more detailed level, e.g., across different kinds of employer provided plans. Yet, 
Cardon and Hendel (2001) performed such an analysis for various categories of employer 
provided plans using the National Medical Expenditure data and found no evidence for 
- 30 - adverse selection in such plans.
15 Thus we view our findings as surprising but not 
implausible. 
VI.B.3. The Relationship Between Observables and Latent Health Status 
In order to better understand the nature of asymmetric information we examine 
the relationship between the latent health shock and observable individual characteristics. 
The results are reported in Table 9 and our preferred specification is column III. We find 
that individuals who are older and white experience larger health shocks, and that the self 
reported health status (“poor” is the omitted category) is positively correlated with latent 
health status recovered from the estimated model.  This is particularly important because 
our model places no restrictions on the relationship between self reported health status 
and the latent health shock. Hence this is further evidence that our model captures the 
trends in the data well and that the estimates are credible. The relationship between 
education and latent health appears to be non linear but is not significant.
16 We also find 
that the correlation between observable individual characteristics and the latent health 
shocks, explains only 5 percent of the variation in the latent health status suggesting that 
it may not be easy for firms to assess the latent health status of individuals using the 
typically observed characteristics of individuals.  This could give rise to substantial 
asymmetric information in health insurance markets. 
We also we find that there is a positive correlation between the latent health 
shocks and elasticities (Table 10). This is consistent with a scenario where individuals 
who have a larger latent health shock (i.e., are more sick) are less elastic. Moreover, in 
                                                 
15 The lack of detail in our nationally representative HRS data prevent us from doing such an analysis but 
an advantage of our data are that our results are more generalizable. A disadvantage of using more detailed 
data that came say from a single firm would be that the results of such a study may not be generalizable. 
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16There is substantial evidence that education and health status are correlated (see e.g., Lleras-Muney 
2005). Our finding that education is not correlated with latent health conditional on self reported health 
does not contradict this evidence.   Figure 7 it is seen that the relationship between latent health shocks and elasticities is also 
highly non linear.  
VI.C. Discussion 
       Our  results  suggest  that  the  demand for health care is not easily captured by 
standard models of the insurance market with a separating equilibrium.  In these models, 
a menu of contracts is offered and consumers sort between alternative contracts based on 
their private information about their health status.  The contracts generate an inefficient 
allocation of resources because insurers inefficiently ration health care by capping 
benefits for the healthiest consumers. 
       Our  results  suggest  that  sorting  between contracts is not particularly well 
explained by an agent’s latent health status.  Interestingly, the summary statistics in Table 
1 are also fairly consistent with this finding in that the differences in self reported health 
status do not vary much between different type of health plans.  It is difficult to reconcile 
these estimates with the conventional wisdom about distortions that occur from “cherry 
picking” in health insurance markets.  This is surprising given the importance that 
adverse selection has received in theoretical models of insurance markets.  A partial 
explanation for this finding is suggested by Figures 1 and 2.  Health insurance is most 
important to consumers when they are very sick and total health expenditures are likely to 
be high.  However, when this is the case, insured consumers on average should expect to 
be reimbursed for a similar (and large) proportion of their medical expenses irrespective 
of plan choice.  Therefore, the incentive to sort between alternative insurance plans seems 
limited.     
       Furthermore, we find that much of the variation in the elasticity of demand for 
health care occurs within a plan, rather than between plans.  Consumers who consume the 
- 32 - least in health service, within a plan, are the most elastic with respect to co-payment 
rates. Relatively little of the variation in this elasticity is explained by sorting across 
plans, with the exception of those with no insurance.  This seems contrary to models in 
which a main purpose of multiple plans is to encourage consumers to economize on 
health expenditures.  Our results suggest that an important question for future theoretical 
research is to explain the nonlinearity in co-payment schedules. 
VII. Conclusion  
We specify a model of demand for health insurance and medical utilization in the 
presence of unobserved heterogeneity in the latent health status of individuals. Using a 
semiparametric procedure we estimate the structural parameters of this model accounting 
adverse selection and moral hazard due to asymmetric information. We use the estimates 
of the model to examine the nature of adverse selection and moral hazard in health 
insurance contracts. We find evidence of moral hazard in health insurance plans but the 
evidence for adverse selection seems to be lacking.  We note that our findings do not 
support a model of separating equilibrium in the insurance market and our estimates 
provide a partial explanation for these findings.  
Although our proposed semi-parametric method provides a more flexible and 
robust alternative for analyzing the empirical issues of adverse selection and moral 
hazard in health insurance, several limitations are acknowledged. The utility function 
specification we use is assumed to be separable in the consumption of the composite 
good and health status. While this specification captures the risk aversion features of 
consumer utilities in health status, it rules out more flexible interactions between the 
utility derived from composite good consumption and health status. It is sometimes 
argued that the marginal utility for composite good consumption might decrease in the 
- 33 - case of severe illness (e.g. Viscusi and Evans 1990). We note, however, that Spence and 
Zeckhauser (1971) and Blomqvist (1997) use a similar specification, and Campo, Guerre, 
Perrigne and Vuong (2003) also require similar restrictions on utility in an auctions 
context. The utility specification also assumes that medical utilization is a perfect 
substitute for an individual’s health status. This is similar to the assumption made by 
Cardon and Hendel (2001). However, we do allow for a flexible nonlinear relationship 
between medical utilization and latent health status, which we expect does incorporate 
some of the stochasticity in the health production relationship. Due to data limitations we 
do not allow for heterogeneity in risk preferences, which can be a potentially important 
determinant of moral hazard and selection in to contracts. However in principle our 
methodology can be extended to incorporate heterogeneity in risk preferences with access 
to better data.  
In conclusion, in spite of these limitations our research is novel in that it develops 
a tractable estimation procedure under minimal parametric assumptions to simultaneously 
examine adverse selection and moral hazard in health insurance contracts. Our research is 
also important as it provides a framework for similar analysis in other contexts, especially 
with cross section data, where distortions exist due to asymmetric information. 
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- 39 - Appendix I: Variable Descriptions 
Variable Variable  Description 
HRS Data 
Health status  Self reported health status: 6-excellent, 5-very good, 4-good, 3-fair, 2 – 
poor  
HH size  Number of members in the household  
Insurance categories 
No insurance, Employer provided insurance,  Self employed with 
insurance through own business,  VA/Champus,  Privately purchased 
insurance,  Medicare 
 
HH OOP med. exp.  total household out of pocket (OOP) cost for med. Care 
HH tot. med. exp.  total imputed household  medical exp. (sum of OOP + insurer payment) 
Rural 
A measure (0-9) of how rural an area is.   
0. Central counties of metropolitan areas of 1 million population or more  
1. Fringe counties of metropolitan areas of 1 million population or more  
2. Counties in metropolitan areas of 250 thousand to 1 million population 
3. Counties in metropolitan areas of than 250 thousand population  
4. Urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metropolitan area  
5. Urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metropolitan 
area  
6. Urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to a metropolitan area  
7. Urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to a metropolitan 
area  
8. Completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a 
metropolitan area  
9. Completely rural or less than 2, urban population, not adjacent to a 
metropolitan area 
 
Urban  1 if Rural = 0 
0 otherwise 
Non HRS Data 
Annual payroll 
Annual Payroll-available at County level 
Source: US Census Bureau (County Business Patterns) 
http://www.census.gov/epcd/cbp/view/cbpview.html 
Total payroll includes all forms of compensation, such as salaries, wages, 
reported tips, commissions, bonuses, vacation allowances, sick-leave 
pay, employee contributions to qualified pension plans, and the value of 
taxable fringe benefits. For corporations, it includes amounts paid to 
officers and executives; for unincorporated businesses, it does not 
include profit or other compensation of proprietors or partners. Payroll is 
reported before deductions for Social Security, income tax, insurance, 
union dues, etc. First-quarter payroll consists of payroll during the 
January-to-March quarter. 
Employees 
Employees per week-available at  County level 
Source : US Census Bureau (County Business Patterns) 
http://www.census.gov/epcd/cbp/view/cbpview.html 
Paid employment consists of full- and part-time employees, including 
salaried officers and executives of corporations, who are on the payroll in 
the pay period including March 12.Included are employees on paid sick 
leave, holidays, and vacations; not included are proprietors and partners 
of unincorporated businesses. 
Establishments 
Total Establishments –available at  County level 
Source : US Census Bureau (County Business Patterns) 
http://www.census.gov/epcd/cbp/view/cbpview.html 
An establishment is a single physical location at which business is 
conducted or services or industrial operations are performed. It is not 
- 40 - necessarily identical with a company or enterprise, which may consist of 
one or more establishments. When two or more activities are carried on 
at a single location under a single ownership, all activities generally are 
grouped together as a single establishment. The entire establishment is 
classified on the basis of its major activity and all data are included in 
that classification. Establishment-size designations are determined by 
paid employment in the mid-March pay period. The size group "1 to 4" 
includes establishments that did not report any paid employees in the 
mid-March pay period but paid wages to at least one employee at some 
time during the year.  
Establishment counts represent the number of locations with paid 
employees any time during the year. This series excludes governmental 
establishments except for wholesale liquor establishments (NAICS 
4228), retail liquor stores (NAICS 44531), Federally-chartered savings 
institutions (NAICS 522120), Federally-chartered credit unions (NAICS 
522130), and hospitals (NAICS 622). 
HPI 
Housing Price Index—Available at State level 
Source : Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight 
http://www.ofheo.gov/HPI.asp 
HPI is a measure designed to capture changes in the value of single 
family homes.  HPI is a weighted repeat sales index that measures 
average price changes in repeat sales or refinancings on the same 
properties.  Data provided by Fannie Mae and Freddi Mac. 
Insurance coverage 
People covered by insurance- Available at State level. 
Source : US Census Bureau CPS 1997 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/cover96/c96tabf.html 
Includes private and government sponsored plans 
GPCI  (Work, 
Malpractice, Practice 
components) 
Available at county level. 
Source : Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 
http://www.mgma.com/research/gpci.cfm 
A Geographic Practice Cost Index (GPCI) is used by Medicare to adjust 
for variance in operating costs of medical practices located in different 
parts of the country. Reimbursement of Physicians for services 
performed under Medicare is governed by a formula that considers the 
product of three factors: 
1. A nationally uniform relative value unit (RVU) for the service; 
2. A GPCI value which adjusts each RVU component (Work, Practice 
Expense, malpractice); 
3. A nationally uniform conversion factor for the service.  
The Conversion Factor converts the relative values into payment 
amounts. For each physician fee schedule service, which is represented 
by an associated Health Care Common Procedure Coding System 
(HCPCS) code, there are three relative values: 
1. An RVU for physician work; 
2. An RVU for practice expense; 
3. An RVU for malpractice expense.  
For each of these components, there is a GPCI which adjusts the RVU 
value based on a practices geographic location. The GPCIs reflect the 
relative costs of practice expenses, malpractice insurance, and physician 
work in an area compared to the national average for each component. 
 
Unemployment Rate 
Available at county level. 




- 41 - Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Description  Obs Mean  Std.  Dev. 
HRS Data 
Health status        
     All insurance categories  3648  4.49  1.07 
     No Insurance  316 3.93  1.15 
     Employer Provided  2644 4.56  1.03 
     Self Employed  81 4.93  .891 
     VA/Champus  123 4.33  1.18 
     Privately Purchased  255 4.67  1.00 
     Medicare  229 4.14  1.16 
Household size  3648  2.40  1.14 
Household income  3648  53917.66  47892.64 
Insurance category  3648  2.46  1.29 
Hh insurance premium  3648  1363.08  2178.08 
Total household OOP cost   3648  1758.87  2622.31 
Total medical expenses  3648  11122.24  13237.82 
Age 3648  58.6187  5.64 
Urban 3648  0.41  0.49 
Non HRS Data 
Annual payroll county  3648  1.01e+07  1.90e+07 
# employees county  3648  328441.3  574392.8 
#establishments county  3648  19917.4  33946.61 
Housing price index  3648  195.74  36.56 
People covered by ins in state  3648  9051.52  6802.55 
Geog Practice Cost index  (work)  3648  .990  .026 
Geog Practice Cost index  (malpractice) 3648  .944  .458 
Geog Practice Cost index  (practice) 3648  .961  .096 
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Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Conditional Mean (α) 3648  1676.14  1131.57  450.46  15079 
Medical expenditure  3648  .109  .033  .0004  .369 
No insurance  3648  -342.58  429.13  -881.14  2901 
Employer provided  3648  -543.38  285.49  -1343.8  2350.2 
Self employed  3648  216.27  1327.95  -2497.6  11107 
VA/Champus 3648  -762.09  718.23  -1631.5  7496.2 
Medicare 3648  -579.36  477.26  -2287.3  4382.9 
Urban 3648  -56.19  333.39  -2771.4  8206.5 
The above table gives the results from a local linear regression estimation of the supply side of the model 
The dependent variable is OOP Medical Expenses.  Privately purchased insurance was the omitted 
insurance category. 
Each individual’s α can be interpreted as their expected OOP Medical Expenses conditional on their 
observable characteristics.   
Each individual’s coefficient on the covariates can be interpreted as the derivative of this conditional 
expectation with respect to the covariate. 
  
- 43 -  











for Health (γ2) 
Coefficient  
of Relative 
 Risk Aversion on 










0.846  1.371  1.521 3994.33  0.827 
(0.1278)  (0.592)  (0.203) (1982.71)   
Standard errors are in parentheses 
 
 
- 44 - Table 4: Elasticity of Total Medical Expenditure w.r.t. the Effective Price of Medical Expenditure by 
Insurance Category 
 
Insurance Category  25
th percentile  Median 75
th Percentile 
All Insurance Categories   -0.47  -0.21  -0.01 
No Insurance  -0.44 -0.18 -0.06 
Employer Provided  -0.47 -0.21 -0.1 
Self Employed  -0.64 -0.24 -0.12 
VA/Champus  -0.48 -0.19 -0.07 
Privately Purchased  -0.42 -0.16 -0.07 
Medicare  -0.45 -0.23 -0.11 
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Table 5: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests for Equality of Distributions of Price Elasticities 
Insurance 
Category 
Employer Provided  Self Employed  VA/Champus  Privately Purchased  Medicare 
 
































      0.1735 
(0.125) 
The pairwise Kolmogorov-Smirnov Statistic is reported with corrected P-Values in parentheses 
 










Urban  -0.016 -0.019  -0.007 -0.007 
  [0.020] [0.020]  [0.020] [0.020] 
HH  size  0.02 0.022  0.02 0.02 
  [0.008]* [0.008]**  [0.008]* [0.008]* 
Age 0.005  0.007  0.006  0.006 
  [0.002]* [0.002]**  [0.002]* [0.002]* 
White 0.061  0.058  0.087  0.089 
 [0.026]*  [0.026]*  [0.026]**  [0.026]** 
Male 0.002  0.006  0.003  0.002 
  [0.022] [0.022]  [0.021] [0.021] 
HH  income  -2.1E-06 -2.1E-06  -1.8E-06 -1.8E-06 
  [3.0E-07]** [3.0E-07]**  [3.0E-07]** [4.0E-07]** 
Insurance  category       
   No Insurance    0.134  0.107  0.106 
   [0.057]*  [0.056]  [0.056] 
   Employer Provided    0.139  0.15  0.15 
   [0.048]**  [0.047]**  [0.047]** 
   Self Employed    0.199  0.216  0.218 
   [0.089]*  [0.087]*  [0.088]* 
   VA/Champus    0.098  0.094  0.094 
   [0.071]  [0.070]  [0.070] 
   Privately Purchased    0.173  0.196  0.196 
   [0.060]**  [0.060]**  [0.060]** 
Health  status       
  Fair      -0.072  -0.071 
     [0.028]*  [0.028]* 
  Good      -0.178  -0.176 
     [0.028]**  [0.029]** 
  Very good      -0.256  -0.255 
     [0.029]**  [0.030]** 
  Excellent      -0.34  -0.339 
     [0.037]**  [0.037]** 
Education       
   12 years        -0.005 
      [0.021] 
   13-15 years        -0.014 
      [0.029] 
   16 years        -0.021 
      [0.042] 
   More than 16 years        0.018 
      [0.038] 
Constant  -0.659 -0.941  -0.705 -0.696 
  [0.130]** [0.161]**  [0.160]** [0.161]** 
Observations  3648 3648  3648 3648 
R-squared 0.03 0.04  0.06 0.06 
Robust standard Errors are reported in brackets.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 7: Health Shocks by Insurance Category 
 
Insurance Category  25
th percentile  Median 75
th Percentile 
All Insurance Categories   708.08  4063.45  11653 
No Insurance  445.73 2648.85  9302.75 
Employer Provided  726 4170  11696 
Self Employed  88.43 3551.7  10862 
VA/Champus  962 5896.6  18976 
Privately Purchased  770 4113  12097 
Medicare  782 4408.9  10740 
 
 
Table 8: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests for Equality of Distributions of Health Shocks 
Insurance 
Category 
Employer Provided  Self Employed  VA/Champus  Privately Purchased  Medicare 
 
































      0.054 
(0.975) 
The pairwise Kolmogorov-Smirnov Statistic is reported with corrected P-Values in parentheses 
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Age 130.12  75.249  80.609 
 [40.04]**  [39.72]  [40.35]* 
White 1,060.80  2,288.25  2,184.14 
 [493.25]*  [489.32]**  [502.63]** 
Male 270.034  285.853  305.074 
 [432.53]  [420.92]  [424.45] 
Health status       
   Fair    -4,099.55  -4,146.58 
   [1,459.13]**  [1,457.8]** 
   Good    -7,808.83  -7,952.54 
   [1,362.70]**  [1,365.04]** 
   Very good    -10,062.47  -10,241.81 
   [1,342.37]**  [1,349.53]** 
   Excellent    -10,914.32  -11,103.97 
   [1,374.61]**  [1,383.97]** 
Education      
   12 years      498.604 
     [564.40] 
   13-15 years      1,124.19 
     [687.91] 
   16 years      591.61 
     [853.46] 
   More than 16 years      143.919 
     [725.47] 
Constant 150.385  10,697.90  10,126.68 
 [2,322.67]  [2,734.11]**  [2,786.15]** 
      
Observations 3648  3648  3648 
R-squared 0.01  0.05  0.05 
The omitted health status category is “poor.”  The omitted education level is “less than 12 years”. 
Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. 
** indicates a variable is statistically significant at the 1% level, * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
 
- 48 - Table 10: Correlations Between Health Shocks and Elasticities by Insurance Category 
 
Insurance Category  Correlation 
All Insurance Categories   0.424 
No Insurance  0.40    
Employer Provided  0.438    
Self Employed  0.514    
VA/Champus  0.448    
Privately Purchased  0.385    




- 49 - Figure 1: Expected OOP Medical Expenses conditional on Total Medical Expenses 
 
 
Expected OOP Expenditure is calculated as the fitted values from a local linear regression of OOP 
Expenditure on Total Medical Expenditure and a series of dummy variables for insurance categories and 
rural location.  Expected OOP Expenditure is calculated for 50 evenly spaced values of Total Medical 
Expenditure with the other covariates held at their means. 
 
- 50 - Figure 2: Derivative of OOP Medical Expenses with respect to Total Medical Expenses 
 
The derivative of Expected OOP Expenditure with respect to Total Medical Expenditure is calculated from 
a local linear regression of OOP Expenditure on Total Medical Expenditure and a series of dummy 
variables for insurance categories and rural location.  The derivative of Expected OOP Expenditure with 
respect to Total Medical Expenditure is calculated for 50 evenly spaced values of Total Medical 
Expenditure with the other covariates held at their means. 
 
- 51 - Figure 3: Density Estimates for Price Elasticities by Insurance Category  
 
This figure plots estimated densities for the recovered elasticity for each of the six insurance categories. 
The estimated densities are calculated using a normal kernel.  Each subplot estimates the density using 
three different bandwidths where the default bandwidth is the optimal bandwidth calculated in Matlab.  The 
solid line is the optimal bandwidth, the dashed line is three times the optimal bandwidth, and the dotted line 
is one third the optimal bandwidth. 
- 52 - Figure 4: CDFs of Elasticity Distributions by Insurance Category 
 
- 53 - Figure 5: Density Estimates for Recovered Health Shock by Insurance Category 
 
 
This figure plots estimated densities for the recovered health shock, theta, for each of the six insurance 
categories. 
The estimated densities are calculated using a normal kernel.  Each subplot estimates the density using 
three different bandwidths where the default bandwidth is the optimal bandwidth calculated in Matlab.  The 
solid line is the optimal bandwidth, the dashed line is three times the optimal bandwidth, and the dotted line 
is one third the optimal bandwidth. 
 
- 54 - Figure 6: CDFs of Health Shock Distributions by Insurance Category 
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